Peace talks are intensive diplomatic processes that aim to bring a conflicting group of warring parties together to reach a compromise and end violence. They often include substantive components (e.g., the distribution of power or the management of natural resources) and organizational/institutional components that promote peace consolidation efforts after the agreement has been reached (e.g., disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or reconciliation programs). While scholars study how to prepare for a peace process and how to achieve a ceasefire, few studies have explored the factors that contribute to successful negotiation outcomes.
This article examines the case studies of the Colombian and Turkish peace negotiations to identify factors that contribute to success or failure in these talks. Both processes were plagued with a host of impediments to the conclusion of a peace agreement, including a lack of trust between the government and insurgents and the fear that the adversaries would use talks as an opportunity to relaunch violence; public criticism of the negotiations and attempts to sabotage the process; and exogenous shocks such as economic downturns or sporadic acts of violence that were not caused by the negotiations.
Nevertheless, the analysis of these two cases suggests that the negotiation framework may be a significant factor in determining whether or not a peace agreement will be achieved. Codifying and publicizing the negotiations, bringing mediators and civil society actors into the process, and providing guidance that protects the process from external exigencies may help to alleviate information asymmetries and commitment problems, reduce the likelihood of disagreement among a broad range of stakeholders, and discourage spoilers who capitalize on negotiation setbacks and failure.