Even after the high-profile failures in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, many policymakers remain committed to regime change. They argue that it is a useful tool for supplanting odious governments, advancing democratic institutions, and protecting human rights. Yet the empirical record demonstrates that armed regime-change missions rarely succeed as intended and often produce unintended consequences, such as humanitarian crises and internal instability within the targeted state.
The United States has a long history of overthrowing foreign regimes, dating back to the many efforts to topple Germany and Japan after World War II. But despite its seductive power, toppling other countries’ governments is not that easy, and the United States has a poor track record of achieving regime change with the least amount of damage to its own interests and global standing.
Moreover, the regime-change process is a complex and time-consuming enterprise. Even after a new government takes power, substantial institution-building is required to ensure legitimacy, stability, and resiliency. Policymakers should be aware of the full scope of these costs before embarking on a regime-change mission.
This article outlines the key steps of the regime-change process and examines how these factors can affect the likelihood of success. It then explores how a regime-change operation can easily become mired in protracted conflict and offers suggestions for mitigating these risks. Finally, it discusses when a policy of forcible regime change may be justifiable and provides an overview of the legal debate on this issue.